David Sanford says a great many things in his paper.1 A reply that included everything I wanted to say in response would be many times longer than his paper. I must therefore be selective.
confer truth in the story on a proposition such that it is a controversial philosophical question whether that proposition is a conceptual falsehood.) Sanford suggests that the existence of an official "parts list" with forty-one entries establishes that a certain lawn-sprinkler has, in the naive or everyday understanding of 'part', exactly forty-one parts. Since at least some of these forty-one parts themselves have proper parts, and since no two of the forty-one overlap,3 it follows that parthood-according to the naive or everyday understanding of parthood-is not a transitive relation. (Since Sanford's argument is for a conceptual or logical point, I will grant for the sake of argument that, contrary to the theory of composite material objects I have defended in Material Beings, the lawn-sprinkler and the forty-one items in the parts list exist-and that at least some of the forty-one items have smaller manufactured items as parts.)
In my view, this is not a cogent argument. I do not say this because of some antipathy to ordinary usage. According to Sanford, I share with Lejewski "an inclination to distance [myself] from actual discourse." I am reluctant to admit to the inclination that I have been charged with, although I am not sure what "distancing oneself from actual discourse" is. I certainly think that actual discourse about parts and wholes provides indispensable data for philosophical theorizing about parts and wholes, and I like to think that I am very sensitive to the features of actual discourse. But this is not Oxford and the year is not 1952. (As Sanford says, things were different then.) We know more about how to interrogate actual discourse than the dons of yore knew. We have learned that the fact that a form of words is "odd" or "not what we should say" does not mean that what it expresses isn't true. We know that falsity and lack of meaning are not the only defects that an utterance can have. It would be odd to say, in conducting the ordinary business of life, that the lawn-sprinkler had a vast number of parts that weren't in the parts list-unless perchance the parts list was annoyingly incomplete and one was giving hyperbolical vent to one's consequent frustration. That is, "This lawnsprinkler has a vast number of parts that aren't in the parts list" would be an odd utterance. Given that the parts-list is in order, then, to adopt the idiom of the dons of yore, the quoted sentence is "not what we should say"; it is something that "one could say only as a joke." Nevertheless, what the sentence expresses is true.4 Furthermore, since we are not here engaged in the ordinary business of life-we are now in what David Lewis calls the philosophy room, and here, owing to differences between the aims of philosophical discourse and the aims of everyday discourse, a different set of conventions and tacit understandings is in force-I can say it and my saying it is not odd and I am not making a joke. And I do say it: the lawn-sprinkler has a vast number of parts that are not in the parts list. Moreover, when I say this, I am using the word 'part' in no technical sense (as I probably should be if I said that the lawn-sprinkler was a part of itself) but simply in its ordinary sense.5 This is pretty evident when you think about it. Suppose that all of the forty-one items in the parts list were manufactured in the USA. Does it follow that-let us be careful to use words only in their everyday senses-every part of the lawn sprinkler was manufactured in the USA? Imagine the manufac- Perhaps it need not be a connected interval, need not be "all in one piece," although that possibility seems very counter-intuitive; but we need not consider that possibility as a separate case, for the "greatest lower bound" principle is easily extended so as to apply to the union of any set of connected intervals.) It will, therefore, have a greatest lower bound, a particular real number. But, surely, we want to say, the physical world (the distribution of matter and radiation in space-time) and the meaning of the phrase 'caught up in the life of' do not together carry enough information to specify a particular real number. (Remember, a rule or procedure that specifies a particular real number must rule out all of the numbers that can be got by subtracting 1 from any of the digits "way out" in the decimal part of that number.) This difficulty is just exactly the difficulty that faces my "degrees of parthood" solution to the Problem of the Many. It looks equally formidable in its present form, and, therefore, I cannot see that Sanford's proposal is an advance on mine. It will do no good to try to evade this point by proposing that sets of admissible valuations be fuzzy. (On the ground that the "greatest lower bound" principle does not hold for fuzzy intervals.) For each fuzzy interval on the real line F, there is a unique classical interval containing just those numbers that belong to F to any degree other than 0. And this classical interval (if it is bounded from below, which it will be since all of its members will be greater than or equal to 0) will have a greatest lower bound: a particular real number, grinning residually up at us like the frog at the bottom of the beer mug. 60ne other matter. Sanford remarks on the unliklihood that my book should have produced "so late in the day" the first conceptual analysis that was both profound and correct. I ought to point out that I was not offering an analysis of composition or any other mereological concept. To attempt that would be to attempt to answer what I called the General Composition Question, which I confessed was too hard for me. I attempted only the first question on the exam, the Special Composition Question, which is, roughly, "Under what conditions does composition occur?" As I also remarked, I am inclined to think that no analysis of composition is possible (other than a trivial analysis, an analysis in terms of some other mereological term like 'part'), because I am inclined to think that mereological terms like 'compose', 'part', 'sum', 'whole', 'fusion', 'overlap', and so on, form a "mereological circle" that cannot be broken into by analysis.
71n his contribution to the Book Symposium. Horgan's paper will be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 8See my reply to Horgan, also to appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 91 am assuming that there are perfectly clear cases of rational numbers such that it is not humanly possible to specify them in decimal notation: for example, the number whose decimal part is like It's for the first 10100 places and consists of zeros thereafter. And I am assuming that there is no sharp borderline between the numbers that it is humanly possible to specify in decimal notation and those that it is not. The use of an irrational number in the example is not essential to its point. A rational number that it was (definitely) not humanly possible to specify in decimal notation would have done as well.
10That is, if S is any non-empty interval on the real line, and if there is some number that is less than any member of S (if S is "bounded from below,") then there is a number that has the following feature: it is either the least member of S or the greatest number that is less than every member of S (the "greatest lower bound" of S). A "non-empty interval on the real line" (strictly, a connected nonempty interval on the real line) is a set that is defined by two real numbers: it contains all the numbers between its two "end-points," and it may or may not contain either or both of the end-points.
